Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Daniel Greco's avatar

This reminds me of a case from my (our?) debate days. I can't remember if I ran it, or if somebody else did, or if nobody did and it's just an idea I heard.

The idea was that when someone agrees to a plea deal, and the judge would like to accept the plea bargain, there's some probability n that the plea nevertheless must be rejected. If the plea is rejected, then the state has to make their case at trial. Then, the fewer of these cases the state wins--ie, the lower their rate of winning when forced to go to trial instead of plead--the higher n becomes, and vice versa. So the state has an incentive not to overcharge, because the more they overcharge and lose, the less they get to use the plea bargaining process at all.

Expand full comment
1 more comment...

No posts