This reminds me of a case from my (our?) debate days. I can't remember if I ran it, or if somebody else did, or if nobody did and it's just an idea I heard.
The idea was that when someone agrees to a plea deal, and the judge would like to accept the plea bargain, there's some probability n that the plea nevertheless must be rejected. If the plea is rejected, then the state has to make their case at trial. Then, the fewer of these cases the state wins--ie, the lower their rate of winning when forced to go to trial instead of plead--the higher n becomes, and vice versa. So the state has an incentive not to overcharge, because the more they overcharge and lose, the less they get to use the plea bargaining process at all.
Yeah, that's a very cool idea! (Gotta say, I wish philosophy had more of the unhinged brilliance of some of these old debate cases.) My sense is that it kind of buys its way out of this (and I know I'm using this loosely) "reference class" problem -- of having to say which cases are of the same kind -- and the problem of how much of a "gap" should trigger sanctions -- especially b/c there may tend to be differences between cases that go to trial and cases that are resolved by a plea agreement -- at the cost of, I guess you could say, the unfairness of forcing defendants to go to trial if they'd rather plead. But yeah, I certainly see the affinity between the ideas.
This reminds me of a case from my (our?) debate days. I can't remember if I ran it, or if somebody else did, or if nobody did and it's just an idea I heard.
The idea was that when someone agrees to a plea deal, and the judge would like to accept the plea bargain, there's some probability n that the plea nevertheless must be rejected. If the plea is rejected, then the state has to make their case at trial. Then, the fewer of these cases the state wins--ie, the lower their rate of winning when forced to go to trial instead of plead--the higher n becomes, and vice versa. So the state has an incentive not to overcharge, because the more they overcharge and lose, the less they get to use the plea bargaining process at all.
Yeah, that's a very cool idea! (Gotta say, I wish philosophy had more of the unhinged brilliance of some of these old debate cases.) My sense is that it kind of buys its way out of this (and I know I'm using this loosely) "reference class" problem -- of having to say which cases are of the same kind -- and the problem of how much of a "gap" should trigger sanctions -- especially b/c there may tend to be differences between cases that go to trial and cases that are resolved by a plea agreement -- at the cost of, I guess you could say, the unfairness of forcing defendants to go to trial if they'd rather plead. But yeah, I certainly see the affinity between the ideas.